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A COMMON LAW TORT OF PRIVACY? 
The challenges of developing a human rights tort 
 
Paula GILIKER 
Professor of Comparative Law, University of Bristol. 
 
1 The interests protected by the law of tort vary considerably in character, from injury 
to the person to protection against wrongful harm to one’s reputation. Yet, as society 
advances and technology permits more and more intrusion into our personal lives, the means 
by which harm may be perpetrated against an individual’s well-being continue to evolve. 
Canadian judge, Sharpe JA, commented recently that “[i]nternet and digital technology have 
brought an enormous change in the way we communicate and in our capacity to capture, store 
and retrieve information”,1 but that this must be balanced against the invasions they permit 
into our personal lives which “cry out for a remedy”.2 Such concerns are, in fact, far from 
new. In the seminal article of Warren and Brandeis in 1890, the authors commented on the 
fact that “[i]nstantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred 
precincts of private and domestic life”.3 Winfield in 1931 further argued that the social 
exigencies of the day justified the creation of a tort of invasion of personal privacy, either by 
the courts or (failing that) the legislature.
4
 Winfield warned, however, of the dangers of a 
“sweeping” tort and of the need to identify with some precision a legal framework 
determining when liability would arise. He identified a number of difficulties which continue 
to this day. First, how to define a new tort which seeks to protect an interest as imprecise as 
“privacy”,5 which has been variably described as one protecting our dignity, autonomy or 
self-esteem,
6
 our right to identity, personal development and to establish and develop 
relationships with other human beings,
7
 or simply the “right to be let alone”?8 Penk and 
Tobin correctly describe privacy as “multidimensional” in that it may be seen as a right, a 
value, or a psychological state with links to human dignity and autonomy.
9
 Secondly, how to 
provide criteria such that the tort may be applied with some degree of certainty and 
predictability? A third question also arises, however. In a modern liberal democracy, freedom 
of expression (and, in particular, freedom of the press) are perceived as values worthy of 
protection. On this basis, the right to freedom of expression is expressly recognised in a 
number of constitutional instruments, for example, under the First Amendment to the US 
                                                          
1
 Jones v Tsige 2012 ONCA 32; (2012) 108 OR (3d) 241 at [67], per Sharpe JA. 
2
 Jones v Tsige 2012 ONCA 32; (2012) 108 OR (3d) 241 at [69], per Sharpe JA. 
3
 Samuel D Warren & Louis D Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy” (1890) 4 Harv L Rev 193 at 195. 
4
 P H Winfield, “Privacy” (1931) 47 LQR 23. 
5
 Many attempts have been made to define “privacy” with various degrees of success, see, notably, Ruth 
Gavison, ‘Privacy and the Limits of the Law” (1980) 89 Yale LJ 421; Nicole Moreham, “Privacy in the 
Common Law: A Doctrinal and Theoretical Analysis” (2005) 121 LQR 628; Raymond Wacks, Personal 
Information: Privacy and the Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); and Daniel J Solove, Understanding 
Privacy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
6
 See Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 AC 457 at [51], per Lord Hoffmann, and Hosking v 
Runting [2004] NZCA 34; [2005] 1 NZLR1 at [239], per Tipping J.  
7
 Peck v UK (44647/98) (2003) 36 EHRR 41 at [57]; Pretty v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 1 at [61]. 
8
 A phrase coined by Judge Cooley and famously cited in Samuel D Warren & Louis D Brandeis, “The Right to 
Privacy” (1890) 4 Harv L Rev 193.   
9
 Stephen Penk & Rosemary Tobin, “The New Zealand Tort of Invasion of Privacy: Future Directions” (2011) 
19 TLJ 191. Wacks indeed argues that the search for a definition is sterile and futile in that privacy is a concept 
so large that it threatens to devour itself: Raymond Wacks, “The Poverty of Privacy” (1980) 96 LQR 73 at 77. 
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Constitution,
10
 Art 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights
11
 (“ECHR”), s 14 of the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
12
 (“Bill of Rights Act”), and s 2 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms
13
 (“Canadian Charter”). The challenge, therefore, for a 
modern privacy tort is to reach an acceptable balance between protecting the right to privacy 
and that of the public to know. As seen in the tort of defamation, this inevitably gives rise to 
difficult value judgments with which both politicians and judges may be reluctant to become 
openly involved.
14
 
 
2 In focusing on a particular evolution in the law of tort – the creation of new torts 
which seek to protect victims against wrongful invasions into their private lives – this article 
will examine the challenges this has presented to the traditional tort law framework. It will 
consider three common law jurisdictions where the courts have recently acknowledged to 
some extent a tort (or torts) protecting privacy rights: England and Wales, New Zealand and 
the Canadian province of Ontario. These are also jurisdictions in which rights-based 
instruments such as the ECHR, the Bill of Rights Act, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights,
15
 the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
16
 and the 
Canadian Charter have influenced the shape of these new forms of tort law. In critically 
analysing recent developments, this article will consider how the courts have responded to the 
challenges of integrating human rights principles into the private law of tort and whether the 
current legal position indicates that, despite the reluctance of politicians to intervene, this is 
an area of law in which legislative intervention is not only desirable, but necessary. 
 
I. A TORT OF PRIVACY?  THE RESPONSE OF ENGLAND AND WALES.   
 
3 Despite the introduction of the UK Human Rights Act 1998
17
 (“the 1998 Act”), the 
courts of England and Wales have continued to reject the creation of a general tort of 
invasion of privacy. Lord Hoffmann in Wainwright v Home Office
18
 was of the view that any 
perceived gaps in the law could (and should) be filled by judicious development of existing 
causes of action such as breach of confidence or, following the introduction of the 1998 Act, 
                                                          
10
 “Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” 
11
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Eur TS No 5; 213 UNTS 221; 
1953 UKTS No 71) (4 November 1950; entry into force 3 September 1953) Art 10.1: “Everyone has the right to 
freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information 
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.” 
12
 1990 No 109. “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and 
impart information and opinions of any kind in any form.” 
13
 Constitution Act 1982 (Canada) Pt I. See s 2 – Fundamental Freedoms:  
Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:  
(a) freedom of conscience and religion;  
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media 
of communication;  
(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and  
(d) freedom of association. 
14
 See, for example, Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] UKSC 11; [2012] 2 AC 273 (revelation of potential 
police corruption) and the privacy case of AAA v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 554 
(revelations of possible paternity of child deemed to give rise to a “difficult and sensitive balancing exercise”: at 
[45]).  
15
 16 December 1966; entry into force 23 March 1976. 
16
 20 November 1989; entry into force 2 September 1990. 
17
 c 42. 
18
 [2003] UKHL 53; [2004] 2 AC 406. 
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with claims under the Act for breach of Art 8 of the ECHR (right to a private life).
19
 There 
was, in his view, no need to “distort” the principles of the common law.20 In so doing, the 
House of Lords rejected any analogy with developments in US law and tellingly quoted from 
Sir Robert Megarry V-C in Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner:
21
 “[I]t is no 
function of the courts to legislate in a new field. The extension of the existing laws and 
principles is one thing, the creation of an altogether new right is another.”22 
 
4 The House of Lords in Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd
23
 (“Campbell”) in 
2004 confirmed that the approach taken by English law would be to acknowledge that, 
following the 1998 Act, there has been a “shift in the centre of gravity” of the action for 
breach of confidence.
24
 No new tort would be created, but the action for breach of confidence 
would be extended to include not only the divulgence of confidential information but also the 
unjustified publication of private information: in this case, a series of articles and 
photographs of supermodel Naomi Campbell detailing and showing her attendance at 
meetings of Narcotics Anonymous. In so doing, the House of Lords accepted that an action 
could be brought even where there was no pre-existing relationship of confidence between 
the individual and the party obtaining the information.
25
 This was, however, more than a 
mere extension of an existing cause of action. In OBG Ltd v Allan,
26
 Lord Nicholls 
recognised that two versions of breach of confidence now existed: the traditional action 
protecting secret/confidential information; and the new action which sought to protect a 
different interest: that of privacy.
27
   
 
5 The court also took a further step in Campbell. Influenced by the argument that the 
court as a “public authority” under s 6(3) of the 1998 Act should seek to develop private law 
in a convention-compatible way,
28
 this new action was found to have absorbed the rights 
protected by Arts 8 and 10 of the ECHR.
29
 Buxton LJ in the later case of McKennitt v Ash
30
 
(“McKennitt”) declared that to find the rules of what he termed the new “tort of breach of 
                                                          
19
 Sections 6 and 7 of the UK Human Rights Act 1998 (c 42) provide for civil claims against public authorities 
for failing to act in compliance with Convention rights. 
20
 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53; [2004] 2 AC 406 at [52]. Lord Hoffmann was also of the view 
(at [51]) that it was not clear that Art 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (Eur TS No 5; 213 UNTS 221; 1953 UKTS No 71) (4 November 1950; entry into force 3 September 
1953) had been breached in this case, but a subsequent appeal to the European Court of Human Rights found 
otherwise: Wainwright v United Kingdom (12350/04) (2007) 44 EHRR 40. 
21
 [1979] Ch 344. 
22
 Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] Ch 344 at 372. 
23
 [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 AC 457. This built on earlier decisions such as Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 1) 
[2001] QB 967 and A v B plc [2002] EWCA Civ 337; [2003] QB 195. 
24
 Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 AC 457 at [51]. 
25
 This is a key requirement under the traditional action for breach of confidence: the information in question 
must have the necessary quality of confidence about it, the information must be imparted in circumstances 
importing an obligation of confidence, and there must be an unauthorised use or disclosure of that information: 
see Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 at 47, per Megarry J. 
26
 [2007] UKHL 21; [2008] 1 AC 1. 
27
 OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21; [2008] 1 AC 1 at [255]. 
28
 For a debate as to the extent of this obligation on the court, see Gavin Phillipson, “Transforming Breach of 
Confidence? Towards a Common Law Right of Privacy under the Human Rights Act” (2003) 66 MLR 726 and 
Murray Hunt, “The ‘Horizontal Effect’ of the Human Rights Act” [1998] PL 423 (which argues for strong 
indirect horizontal effect). 
29
 Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 AC 457 at [17]. 
30
 [2006] EWCA Civ 1714; [2008] QB 73. 
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confidence”, the courts should look in the jurisprudence of these articles which were not 
merely of persuasive or parallel effect but provided the very content of the domestic tort that 
the English court had to enforce.
31
   
 
6 From these cases, a new methodology can be identified whereby liability is 
determined by asking two questions:  
 
(a) Is there a reasonable expectation of privacy? This will be shown if the 
information is private in the sense that it is protected by Art 8 of the ECHR. 
(b) Where Art 8 is engaged, is interference with this right justified in all the 
circumstances by Art 10 of the ECHR (freedom of expression)?
32
 
 
In determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, a number of factors may 
be relevant, for example, the attributes of the claimant; the nature of the activity in which the 
claimant was engaged; the place at which it was happening; the nature and purpose of the 
intrusion; the absence of consent and whether it was known, or could be inferred; and the 
effect on the claimant and the circumstances in which (and the purposes for which) the 
information came into the hands of the publisher.
33
 The court will take account of all the 
circumstances of the case and, indeed, in many cases, the information in question may be 
obviously private, for example, information relating to health (as in Campbell), personal 
relationships (as in McKennitt) or financial matters.
34
 At stage two, the court will have to ask 
whether the intrusion into the claimant’s privacy is proportionate to the public interest alleged 
to be served by it.
35
 The courts take the view that Arts 8 and 10 are of equal weight.
36
 On this 
basis, where the values inherent within the two Articles are in conflict, an intense focus on 
the comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case is 
necessary and the justifications for interfering with or restricting each right must be taken into 
account and the proportionality test must be applied to each.
37
 This has been called the 
ultimate balancing test.
38
 
 
7 This leads to an unusual pattern of legal development in which European human 
rights law is helping to shape national forms of actions. The action, which Lord Nicholls 
suggested in Campbell would be better encapsulated as “the tort of misuse of private 
information”,39 has recently been acknowledged by the Court of Appeal in Vidal-Hall v 
                                                          
31
 McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714; [2008] QB 73 at [11]. 
32
 See McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714; [2008] QB 73 at [11]; Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers 
Ltd [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 AC 457 at [17]–[21]; and Murray v Express Newspapers plc [2008] EWCA Civ 
446; [2009] Ch 481 at [40]. 
33
 Murray v Express Newspapers plc [2008] EWCA Civ 446; [2009] Ch 481 at [36]. For criticism that this gives 
insufficient guidance to courts, see Amedeo F Cappuccio, “The Private Nature of Information” [2014] IPQ 159. 
34
 Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 AC 457 at [136]. See also Tugendhat 
and Christie: The Law of Privacy and the Media (Mark Warby, Nicole Moreham & Iain Christie eds) (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 2011) at paras 5.28–5.79. 
35
 See Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 at [14], per Eady J. 
36
 Re S (a child) [2004] UKHL 47; [2005] 1 AC 593 at [17], per Lord Steyn. 
37
 Re S (a child) [2004] UKHL 47; [2005] 1 AC 593 at [17], per Lord Steyn. 
38
 See generally Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (Michael A Jones, Anthony Dugdale & Mark Simpson gen eds) 
(London: Sweet and Maxwell, 21st Ed, 2014) at para 27-44: “Balancing art 8 and art 10”. 
39
 Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 AC 457 at [14].   
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Google Inc
40
 to be correctly labelled as a tort. The English courts have thus created a 
distinctive form of tort law which differs both in character and focus from traditional causes 
of action. This pattern of legal development also differs, as will be shown below,
41
 from the 
incremental development of new forms of tort law in other common law jurisdictions. 
 
II. PRIVACY TORTS IN OTHER COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS: THE US, 
NEW ZEALAND AND ONTARIO  
 
A. The US 
8 Other common law jurisdictions have been willing to create new torts which protect 
privacy interests and the most well known – and indeed the inspiration for developments in 
New Zealand and Ontario which will be examined below
42
 – is the law stated in the US 
Restatement (Second) of Torts
43
 (“US Restatement”). Section 652A identifies four types of 
intrusion against which the law should offer some protection:
44
  
 
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as stated in 652B; or 
(b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness, as stated in 652C; or 
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life, as stated in 652D; or 
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public. 
 
9 The US approach, therefore, is to address invasion of privacy rights by means of four 
separate torts which protect distinct (if overlapping) interests. While the English action for 
misuse of private information may be seen to resemble the protection provided by section 
652A(c), important differences exist. Section 652D provides that:  
… one who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to 
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that 
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to 
the public. 
The US Restatement therefore uses the “highly offensive” test as a limiting factor, reflecting 
concerns that the law of tort should not unduly restrict freedom of expression, as protected by 
the First Amendment to the US Constitution. This limitation is not one, however, which the 
English courts have adopted. Lord Nicholls in Campbell argued that such a test should be 
used with caution as it represented a stricter test than that of reasonable expectation of 
privacy,
45
 although it might be relevant to proportionality during the stage two exercise of 
balancing Arts 8 and 10.
46
  This test has nevertheless proven influential elsewhere in the 
common law world, notably in New Zealand and Ontario where the courts have shown 
                                                          
40
 [2015] EWCA Civ 311 (albeit in the context of the rules providing for service of proceedings out of the 
jurisdiction). The Court of Appeal held nevertheless that while the actions for breach of confidence and misuse 
of private information rested on different legal foundations and it was helpful to label the latter correctly, the 
courts were not creating a new cause of action: Vidal-Hall v Google Inc [2015] EWCA Civ 311 at [51]. 
41
 See paras 8-18 below. 
42
 See paras 10-18 below. 
43
 American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Torts (American Law Institute, 1977). 
44
 Note the influence of Prosser, notably in William L Prosser, “Privacy” (1960) 48 Cal L Rev 383, on US 
privacy law. See also Neil M Richards & Daniel J Solove, “Prosser’s Privacy Law:  A Mixed Legacy” (2010) 98 
Cal L Rev 1887. 
45
 Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 AC 457 at [22]. Contrast, however, the 
views of Lord Hope: at [94]. 
46
 See also Murray v Express Newspapers plc [2008] EWCA Civ 446; [2009] Ch 481 at [26]. 
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themselves to be far more willing to recognise distinct torts protecting individuals against 
invasions into their privacy.
47
 No jurisdiction, however, has adopted a general privacy tort. 
 
B. New Zealand 
10 In New Zealand, the courts in Hosking v Runting
48
 (“Hosking”) and more recently in 
C v Holland
49
 have accepted the need for common law torts which protect against the 
wrongful publication of private information and intrusion into one’s private affairs.50 Indeed, 
in the 2004 decision of Hosking, the majority of the court established a two-stage test for 
breaches of informational privacy. The plaintiff must prove: 
 
(a) the existence of facts of which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy; 
and 
(b) publicity given to those private facts that would be considered highly 
offensive to an objective reasonable person.
51
 
 
11 It added that there should be available a defence enabling publication to be justified 
by a legitimate public concern in the information. This would ensure that the scope of privacy 
protection did not exceed the limits on freedom of expression as justified in a free and 
democratic society.
52
 Such developments build on existing case law
53
 and statutes,
54
 but also 
international treaties to which New Zealand is a party.
55
 Despite the absence of any express 
right to privacy in the Bill of Rights Act,
56
 an incremental approach is adopted to create a 
new tort with its own specific requirements. In C v Holland, Whata J argued that it was 
“functionally appropriate” to extend the common law to establish a second tort equivalent to 
the US Restatement section 652B tort of intrusion upon seclusion. In this case, Holland had 
secretly videoed his flatmate’s girlfriend while showering and kept the video on his laptop, 
but had not distributed or publicised the video in any way. His counsel therefore argued that, 
                                                          
47
 Contrast, however, Australia where in ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 63; (2001) 208 CLR 
199 the High Court of Australia held that the question of a privacy tort has yet to be resolved with finality. See 
also Kit Barker et al, The Law of Torts in Australia (Australia: Oxford University Press, 5th Ed, 2012) at 
pp 392–393. 
48
 [2004] NZCA 34; [2005] 1 NZLR 1.  
49
 [2012] NZHC 2155; [2012] 3 NZLR 672 (Hosking v Runting [2004] NZCA 34; [2005] 1 NZLR 1 had left 
open the question whether an intrusion tort should be recognised: at [118]). 
50
 Note also the 2010 report of the New Zealand Law Commission on privacy law (New Zealand, Law 
Commission, Invasion of Privacy: Penalties and Remedies: Review of the Law of Privacy: Stage 3 (NZLC 
R113, February 2010)) which recommended that the tort of invasion of privacy be left to be developed by the 
courts. 
51
 Hosking v Runting [2004] NZCA 34; [2005] 1 NZLR 1 at [117]. 
52
 Hosking v Runting [2004] NZCA 34; [2005] 1 NZLR 1 at [129]–[135]. This places the burden of proof on the 
defendant to provide evidence of the concern in question. See also Aubry v Editions Vice-Versa [1998] 1 SCR 
591 (Canada). 
53
 Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd [1986] 2 NZLR 716; Bradley v Wingnut Films Ltd [1993] 1 NZLR 415; 
P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591. 
54
 See, for example, the Privacy Act 1993 (1993 No 28), Broadcasting Act 1989 (1989 No 25) and the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (1990 No 109). 
55
 Eg, privacy rights in Art 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966; 
entry into force 23 March 1976) and Art 16 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(20 November 1989; entry into force 2 September 1990). 
56
 Section 21 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (1990 No 109) confers a right to be secure against 
unreasonable search and seizure, but the Act does not incorporate a general right to privacy: Lange v Atkinson 
[2000] 3 NZLR 385 at 396. 
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in the absence of publicity of private information, the facts fell outside Hosking. The court 
refused to deny the plaintiff a claim, arguing that a tort of intrusion upon seclusion was, in 
view of case law development, entirely compatible with and a logical adjunct to the Hosking 
tort of wrongful publication of private facts and consistent with the role of the common law 
to adapt in the light of a changing social context.
57
 This new tort would thus reflect both the 
influence of the US Restatement but also the case law of the domestic court. It requires: 
 
(a) an intentional and unauthorised intrusion;  
(b) into seclusion (namely intimate personal activity, space or affairs); 
(c) involving infringement of a reasonable expectation of privacy; and 
(d) that is highly offensive to a reasonable person.58 
 
The latter two requirements mirror the Hosking test. Whata J added that a legitimate public 
concern in the information would provide a defence to the privacy claim.
59
 
 
12 The New Zealand courts are thereby constructing, incrementally, a tortious 
framework for the protection of privacy interests. Whata J rejected the Campbell reasonable 
expectation of privacy test as “not sufficiently prescriptive”,60 preferring a test which set out 
clear criteria for liability and which would thus set a boundary for judicial intervention. Both 
courts recognised that the importance of freedom of expression signified that any tort of 
privacy must be tightly confined.
61
 On this basis, the requirement that publication would be 
“highly offensive” to a reasonable person and the defence of legitimate public concern were 
deemed necessary to ensure that appropriate respect would be given to this right which is 
expressly acknowledged in the Bill of Rights Act. This does, however, create a division 
between the approach taken in New Zealand and that adopted in England and Wales. In 
Hosking, photographs taken of a celebrity couple’s 18-month-old twins in the street without 
their accompanying mother’s knowledge or consent were not found to satisfy the twofold 
test. The court was not convinced that a person of ordinary sensibilities would find the 
publication of these photographs, taken in a public place and not disclosing anything more 
than could have been observed by any member of the public on that day, highly offensive or 
objectionable even bearing in mind that young children were involved. In contrast, in Murray 
v Express Newspapers plc
62
 photographs taken of author JK Rowling’s 19-month-old son on 
a family outing in a public street did raise an arguable case for liability. In this instance, Art 8 
of the ECHR may be seen to have encouraged the English court to adopt a more generous 
approach to the claimant’s right to privacy in contrast to a system influenced by the US 
Restatement which places greater weight on freedom of expression (as protected by the First 
                                                          
57
 C v Holland [2012] NZHC 2155; [2012] 3 NZLR 672 at [75]. See also Faesenkloet v Jenkin [2014] NZHC 
1637 in which the court stressed the common elements of both torts and, indeed, questioned the need for two 
separate torts. 
58
 C v Holland [2012] NZHC 2155; [2012] 3 NZLR 672 at [94]. The requirements are similar but not identical 
to section 652B of the US Restatement (Second) of Torts:  
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his 
private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. 
59
 Following Hosking v Runting [2004] NZCA 34; [2005] 1 NZLR 1 at [134]. 
60
 C v Holland [2012] NZHC 2155; [2012] 3 NZLR 672 at [97]. 
61
 Hosking v Runting [2004] NZCA 34; [2005] 1 NZLR 1 at [130]. 
62
 [2008] EWCA Civ 446; [2009] Ch 481. 
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Amendment to the Constitution) in privacy actions.
63
 It is clear that the different legal 
framework within which each system operates has led to divergence in decision-making in 
privacy actions. 
 
C. Ontario 
13 Ontario provides a third example of incremental common law development of a 
limited privacy tort. In Jones v Tsige
64
 (“Tsige”), the Court of Appeal for Ontario was 
prepared to recognise a tort of intrusion upon seclusion.
65
 In reaching this conclusion, the 
court made express reference to the US Restatement and other domestic provisions, notably 
case law under the Canadian Charter which, in the court’s view, provided significant support 
for the recognition of a specific tort protecting against intrusion upon seclusion. Charter 
jurisprudence, in particular, was found to have already specifically identified as worthy of 
protection a right to informational privacy, despite the fact that the Canadian Charter contains 
no provision which explicitly protects the right to privacy.
66
 The test adopted again reflects 
US influences, namely the plaintiff must show that: 
 
(a) the defendant’s conduct was intentional or reckless;  
(b) the defendant invaded the plaintiff’s private affairs or concerns without lawful 
justification; and 
(c) a reasonable person would regard the invasion as highly offensive, causing 
distress, humiliation or anguish.
67
  
 
14 In this case in which the defendant had examined the plaintiff’s private bank records 
at least 174 times, apparently out of curiosity arising from the fact that the defendant was in a 
relationship with the plaintiff’s ex-husband, the court noted that the law of Canada seemed to 
be drifting closer to the American model.
68
 In view of explicit recognition of a right to 
privacy as underlying specific Charter rights and freedoms
69
 and the principle that the 
common law should be developed in a manner consistent with Charter values, it was time to 
recognise a civil action for damages for intrusion upon seclusion. Such a move “would 
amount to an incremental step that is consistent with the role of [the] court to develop the 
common law in a manner consistent with the changing needs of society”.70 
 
15 In so doing, the Canadian court again was keen to stress the limits of this new action. 
It will be confined to deliberate and significant invasions of personal privacy, and intrusions 
which (viewed objectively on the reasonable person standard) would be described as “highly 
                                                          
63
 Query too much weight in that commentators have noted the shockingly low success rate for actions for 
wrongful intrusion and disclosure in the US: see, for example, David Anderson, “The Failure of American 
Privacy Law” in Protecting Privacy (Basil S Markesinis ed) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Diane 
Zimmerman, “Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort” (1983) 68 
Cornell L Rev 291. 
64
 2012 ONCA 32; (2012) 108 OR (3d) 241. 
65
 The position in Ontario concerning privacy should be contrasted with other provinces such as British 
Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Newfoundland which have made statutory provision for a civil cause of 
action. For example, see the British Columbia Privacy Act (RSBC 1996, c 373). 
66
 Jones v Tsige 2012 ONCA 32; (2012) 108 OR (3d) 241 at [39]–[46]. 
67
 Jones v Tsige 2012 ONCA 32; (2012) 108 OR (3d) 241 at [71]. 
68
 See Allen M Linden & Bruce Feldthusen, Canadian Tort Law (Toronto: LexisNexis, 9th Ed, 2011) at p 59. 
69
 Eg, s 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on protection against unreasonable search and 
seizure. 
70
 Jones v Tsige 2012 ONCA 32; (2012) 108 OR (3d) 241 at [65], per Sharpe JA. 
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offensive”. On this basis, the court believed that proper weight could also be given to the 
constitutional value of free expression on matters of public interest and that there was no risk 
of the floodgates being opened to a multitude of claims.
71
 Further, absent proof of actual 
pecuniary loss, damages awards should be modest and awards of aggravated and punitive 
damages, while not excluded, should not be encouraged either.
72
 
 
16 In New Zealand and Ontario, therefore, the courts have been prepared to address what 
they perceived as a gap in the law by developing the law of tort to provide compensation for 
those whose privacy has been invaded. In neither case was the “reticence” of Parliament in 
failing to legislate deemed a valid reason for failing to develop the common law to fill this 
gap.
73
 Tipping J in Hosking was in no doubt that it was:
74
  
… legally preferable and better for society’s understanding of what the Courts are doing to 
achieve the appropriate substantive outcome under a self contained and stand-alone common 
law cause of action to be known as invasion of privacy. 
The torts which follow, however, possess strict requirements with concern being expressed to 
limiting their scope and giving some level of predictability and certainty. Importance is also 
placed on ensuring that freedom of expression is still seen to be valued as a right inherent in a 
liberal democracy. 
 
17 Such an approach presents an obvious contrast to the apparent timidity of the English 
courts until recently to recognise a new tort protecting against intrusions into informational 
privacy. The preference instead to “shoehorn”75 protection into the existing action for breach 
of confidence rather than create a new tort does suggest a reluctance to engage in change, and 
yet the practical effect of the courts’ decisions has been to offer protection against 
photographs taken in public places
76
 and even award super-injunctions (that is, interim non-
disclosure orders which prohibit disclosure of even the fact that an injunction has been 
granted) which necessitated the publication of Practice Guidance
77
 by the courts to regulate 
their use in view of freedom of expression concerns.
78
 
 
18 It is submitted that in all these jurisdictions the common law courts have been 
developing the law to meet the changing needs of society, but that in view of the different 
legal framework, this has led to very different approaches. For Canada and New Zealand, 
legal development by analogy and incrementally represents the typical “common law” 
method of legal evolution in which the legislator is only to be called upon when necessary to 
resolve matters the courts are unable to resolve themselves. It is England and Wales which is 
the outlier, and the reason for this lies with the impact of the ECHR on private law legal 
development. 
                                                          
71
 Jones v Tsige 2012 ONCA 32; (2012) 108 OR (3d) 241 at [72]. 
72
 Jones v Tsige 2012 ONCA 32; (2012) 108 OR (3d) 241 at [87]–[88]. Proof of harm to a recognised economic 
interest is not, however, an element of the cause of action. 
73
 See C v Holland [2012] NZHC 2155; [2012] 3 NZLR 672 at [88] (“[I]t is the function of the Courts to hear 
and determine claims by litigants seeking to vindicate alleged rights or correct alleged wrongs”) and Jones v 
Tsige 2012 ONCA 32; (2012) 108 OR (3d) 241 at [54]. 
74
 Hosking v Runting [2004] NZCA 34; [2005] 1 NZLR 1 at [246]. 
75
 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2005] EWCA Civ 595; [2006] QB 125 at [96]. 
76
 As seen in the cases brought by Naomi Campbell and on behalf of J K Rowling’s son and, more recently, that 
of Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2014] EWHC 1163. 
77
 Practice Guidance: Interim Non-Disclosure Orders [2012] 1 WLR 1003. 
78
 Terry v Persons Unknown [2010] EWHC 119; [2010] 1 FCR 659. 
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III. THE PROBLEMS OF CREATING A (EUROPEAN) HUMAN RIGHTS TORT 
IN A COMMON LAW SYSTEM OF TORTS. 
 
19 In developing tort law, the common law has traditionally demonstrated a reluctance to 
engage in radical legal development. In the words of Brennan J, “[i]t is preferable, in my 
view, that the law should develop ... incrementally and by analogy with established 
categories”.79 One sees, therefore, emphasis on categorisation and the identification of tests 
which are able to determine the scope and limits of liability without undermining the stability 
of the current legal position.
80
 This approach is reflected in the case law examined above:
81
 
the courts rejecting a tort of privacy per se as far too vague and broad-ranging, but accepting 
that aspects of privacy are worthy of protection, notably the publication of private or personal 
information and intrusion into the private affairs of another. Lisa Austin has identified in the 
context of privacy a palpable “containment anxiety”82 in which courts try to juggle an 
obvious need to provide some action against privacy invasion against its fears of an ill-
defined and amorphous action which unduly restricts freedom of expression. This leads, in 
her view, to a preference for protecting privacy rights by expanding existing causes of action 
or at least by proceeding incrementally. In particular, she finds a general distrust of high-level 
principle.
83
 Her analysis does appear to be relevant to the common law systems in this article. 
Austin argues that containment anxiety has encouraged the courts to require that the 
publication of private facts be highly offensive (US, New Zealand and Ontario), that other 
values (such as freedom of expression) should be privileged (US) and to resort to existing 
causes of action (England and Wales). On this basis, it is not surprising that a common law 
academic, such as Mulheron, in advocating a tort of privacy in England and Wales, prefers to 
follow the path taken in New Zealand and the US and propose a tort which protects 
particular, defined interests such as territorial privacy, privacy of the person and 
informational privacy.
84
 Arguably in a world without the ECHR and the 1998 Act, this is 
exactly what would have happened. However, as both a signatory to the ECHR and by virtue 
of national legislation, England and Wales has evolved a “tort” of misuse of private 
information which, unlike its New Zealand and Ontario counterparts, is not merely an 
incremental development of national case law and legislation influenced by international 
conventions and contemporary policy concerns, but one whose content is embodied in the 
tensions between Arts 8 and 10 of the ECHR.
85
 The English common law is developing a tort 
of privacy incrementally, but under the influence of the ECHR and, by virtue of s 2(1) of the 
1998 Act, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”). This causes an 
inevitable divergence in the common law world. It is to Strasbourg, not Auckland or Toronto, 
to which the English judges must turn. What is created is a distinct cause of action. 
                                                          
79 Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 60 ALR 1 at 43; (1985) 157 CLR 424 at 481. 
80
 For criticism, see Ken Oliphant, “Against Certainty in Tort Law” in Tort Law: Challenging Orthodoxy 
(Stephen G A Pitel, Jason W Neyers & Erika Chamberlain eds) (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1st Ed, 2013) which 
argues that the pursuit of “bright lines” rules of tortious liability may, in reality, lead to unjust results. 
81
 See paras 3-16 above. 
82
 Lisa M Austin, “Privacy and Private Law: The Dilemma of Justification” (2010) 55 McGill LJ 165. 
83
 Lisa M Austin, “Privacy and Private Law: The Dilemma of Justification” (2010) 55 McGill LJ 165 at 175. 
See, for example, Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53; [2004] 2 AC 406 at [18], per Lord Hoffmann. 
84
 Rachael Mulheron, “A Potential Framework for Privacy? A Reply to Hello!” (2006) 69 MLR 679 at 713. 
85
 In Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 AC 457 at [17], Lord Nicholls 
recognised that, following the UK Human Rights Act 1998 (c 42), “[t]he time has come to recognise that the 
values enshrined in Articles 8 and 10 are now part of the cause of action for breach of confidence”. 
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20 Yet this new cause of action faces a number of difficulties which do not arise in other 
common law jurisdictions.
86
 First, it must identify the extent to which ECHR case law will 
influence the application of the two-stage test for liability. Secondly, it must seek to integrate 
this new tort within the existing system of nominate torts. The challenges this presents for the 
courts of England and Wales will be examined in more detail below.
87
  
 
A. Applying a “human rights” tort. 
21 In examining the nature of the English cause of action, it is necessary first of all to 
outline the distinctive nature of Art 8 ECHR rights.
88
  The Art 8 right to a private life is a 
qualified right. Paragraph 2 provides that:  
there shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such 
as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others. 
By its very nature, therefore, Art 8 envisages a balancing of competing rights, none of which 
is predominant, in determining whether the interference with Art 8 is lawful and a necessary 
or proportionate response. It has also been found to create negative and positive obligations 
on the State, to abstain from arbitrary interference in private or family life, but also to adopt 
measures designed to secure respect for private life even in private disputes.
89
 While the State 
has a margin of appreciation in choosing the means by which to secure compliance with Art 
8,
90
 the nature of the State’s obligation will depend on the particular aspect of private life that 
is at issue.
91
 This position does signify, however, that there remains a lack of clarity as to the 
nature and extent of the positive obligations imposed by Art 8.
92
   
 
22 Such a framework, in contrast to the other common law jurisdictions discussed above, 
entails that freedom of expression has equal, but no more, importance compared to that of the 
right to a private life. This is inherent in the two-stage test for the misuse of private 
information action and serves to distinguish the English tort. Yet the differences from other 
common law jurisdictions are more fundamental. Section 2(1) of the 1998 Act requires the 
court to “take into account” case law of the ECtHR in interpreting ECHR rights and this 
means that in applying the two-stage test, the courts are expected to, at least, refer to 
                                                          
86
 Save, of course, the Republic of Ireland. The Irish courts have developed a constitutional right to privacy on 
the basis of Art 40.3.1 of the 1937 Constitution under which the State guarantees to respect, defend and 
vindicate the personal rights of the citizen. 
87
 See paras 21-36 below. 
88
 See generally David Harris et al, Harris, O'Boyle, and Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed, 2014) ch 12. 
89
 X and Y v The Netherlands (8978/80) (1986) 8 EHRR 235 at [23]. 
90
 See Handyside v UK (A/24) (1979–1980) 1 EHRR 737. A wide margin of appreciation will exist in cases 
where the State is required to strike a balance between competing private and public interests or rights set out in 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Eur TS No 5; 213 UNTS 221; 
1953 UKTS No 71) (4 November 1950; entry into force 3 September 1953) (Evans v UK (6339/05) (2008) 46 
EHRR 34), although the court has indicated that where the interference involves a most intimate aspect of 
private life, the margin allowed to the State will be narrowed: Söderman v Sweden (5786/08) (2014) 58 EHRR 
36 at [79].   
91
 Söderman v Sweden (5786/08) (2014) 58 EHRR 36. See also X and Y v the Netherlands (8978/80) (1986) 8 
EHRR 235 at [24]; Von Hannover v Germany (No 2) (40660/08) (2012) 55 EHRR 15 at [104]. 
92
 David Harris et al, Harris, O'Boyle, and Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed, 2014) at p 533. 
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Strasbourg case law for guidance. In this field, the ECtHR’s decision in Von Hannover v 
Germany
93
 (“Von Hannover”) has proven to be of particular importance. Here, the ECtHR 
extended the protection provided by Art 8 and found that the publication of photographs of 
Princess Caroline of Monaco enjoying such innocuous activities as shopping or playing 
tennis violated her Art 8 rights even when the photographs were taken in a public place. The 
court found that there was “a zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public 
context, which may fall within the scope of ‘private life’”.94 Buxton LJ in McKennitt 
commented that to identify the content of Arts 8 and 10 rights, “we do have to look to Von 
Hannover”.95 It seems clear, therefore, that citation of ECtHR case law will be necessary in 
English cases, particularly in determining the scope and application of the misuse of private 
information action. 
 
23 This raises problems, both practical and political.  The judgments of the ECtHR are 
often orientated to the facts of a particular case, giving little general guidance. Lord Mance 
warned in Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Trust
96
 that individual decisions of the ECtHR would 
rarely respond well to the “same close linguistic analysis that a common lawyer would give 
to, binding precedents”. A good example may be found in relation to Art 8 itself where the 
Strasbourg court has consistently refused to provide a clear definition of the meaning of the 
term “private life”. In Reklos v Greece97 (“Reklos”), it stated that:98  
 
... according to its case-law ‘private life’ is a broad concept not susceptible to exhaustive 
definition. The notion encompasses the right to identity ... and the right to personal 
development, whether in terms of personality ... or of personal autonomy, which is an 
important principle underlying the interpretation of the Article 8 guarantees. 
 
Article 8 has been rightly described as “the least defined and most unruly of the rights 
enshrined in the Convention”.99 ECtHR judge, Mahoney, recently acknowledged that when it 
comes to balancing conflicting rights, Strasbourg rarely gives a concrete answer and can at 
                                                          
93
 (2005) 40 EHRR 1. Note also the European Court of Human Right’s subsequent decisions in Von Hannover v 
Germany (No 2) (40660/08) (2012) 55 EHRR 15 and Axel Springer AG v Germany (39954/08) (2012) 55 EHRR 
6, cited in recent case law such as Rocknroll v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2013] EWHC 24 at [31] and 
Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2014] EWHC 1163 at [52]. 
94
 Von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1 at [50]. For criticism, see Gavin Phillipson, “The ‘Right’ to 
Privacy in England and Strasbourg Compared” in New Dimensions in Privacy Law: International and 
Comparative Perspectives (Andrew T Kenyon & Megan Richardson eds) (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006). 
95
 McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714; [2008] QB 73 at [64], thereby dismissing the earlier authority of 
the Court of Appeal in A v B [2002] EWCA Civ 337 in a somewhat questionable use of precedent: see Nicole 
Moreham, “Privacy and Horizontality: Relegating the Common Law” (2007) 123 LQR 373. This should be 
compared with Kay v Lambeth LBC [2006] UKHL 10; [2006] 2 AC 465: in the event of a conflict between a 
decision of the Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights, lower courts must follow the former. 
96
 [2012] UKSC 2; [2012] 2 AC 72 at [123]. 
97
 (1234/05) [2009] ECHR 200; [2009] EMLR 290.   
98
 Reklos v Greece (1234/05) [2009] ECHR 200; [2009] EMLR 290 at [39]. See also Peck v UK (44647/98) 
(2003) 36 EHRR 41 at [57] and Pretty v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 1 at [61]. 
99
 R (on the application of Wright) v Secretary of State for Health [2006] EWHC 2886; [2007] 1 All ER 825 at 
[60], per Stanley Burton J. 
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best only provide a source of guidance as to the philosophy, values or considerations to be 
weighed in the balance by national courts when applying their own domestic law.
100
 
 
24 Such uncertainty is exacerbated by the status of the ECHR as a “living instrument”,101 
that is, one which evolves over time in response to changes in society across the democracies 
of Europe. This ensures that the ECHR, first drafted in 1950, responds to contemporary 
concerns, but also signifies that its meaning is never static and that the Strasbourg court is 
encouraged (backed by the absence of any doctrine of precedent) to develop the law 
proactively which, in the view of the majority of commentators, requires the court to act to 
enhance further the content of human rights.
102
 While such flexibility may seem desirable in 
terms of changing social and economic concerns, it can raise problems in determining exactly 
what the Strasbourg position is on matters such as the balance between the right to privacy 
and the right to freedom of expression. In Von Hannover, as indicated above, the Strasbourg 
court suggested a very broad interpretation of privacy, but in a second case brought by 
Princess Caroline (Von Hannover v Germany (No 2))
103
 a slightly different approach to the 
same complaint can be identified: the publication of photographs taken in a public place. In 
the second case, the Strasbourg court appeared to be willing to place more weight on freedom 
of expression and was prepared to accept the argument that a photograph of Princess Caroline 
on a skiing holiday did not violate Art 8 on the somewhat generous ground that it was linked 
to a discussion regarding the health of her father, Prince Rainier of Monaco.
104
 This was 
deemed to be consistent with its earlier view that an initial essential criterion was that such 
photographs should contribute to a debate of general interest. 
 
25 These cases do indicate that the very nature of the case law of the ECtHR will often 
render it difficult for a common law court to find clear guidance. Some commentators, 
notably politicians, have also questioned to what extent the Strasbourg court should inform 
our interpretation of privacy rights. Does, in other words, a duty to “take into account” 
Strasbourg decisions indicate that the English courts are obliged to follow its rulings? While 
the Ullah principle (stated by Lord Bingham) indicates that the duty of the national court “is 
to keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over time, no more, but certainly 
no less”,105 the impact of the Ullah principle on judicial reasoning, particularly in the UK 
Supreme Court, remains a matter for debate.
106
 To what extent may English law provide its 
own gloss on the application of Arts 8 and 10 rights? Is it obliged to follow the interpretation 
                                                          
100
 Paul Mahoney, “The Relationship between the Strasbourg Court and the National Courts” (2014) 130 LQR 
568 at 578. 
101
 See Judge Garlicki in Van Colle v United Kingdom (7678/09) (2013) 56 EHRR 23 and Tyrer v United 
Kingdom (5856/72) (1979–1980) 2 EHRR 1 at 31. 
102
 Bernadette Rainey, Elizabeth Wicks & Clare Ovey, Jacobs, White and Ovey: the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 6th Ed, 2014) at p 74. 
103
 (40660/08) (2012) 55 EHRR 15. See also Axel Springer AG v Germany (39954/08) (2012) 55 EHRR 6 and 
Von Hannover v Germany (No 3) (8772/10) (2013) ECHR 264 at [50] where the court has indicated a more 
“light touch” form of supervision to privacy claims, whereby only serious reasons would lead it to substitute its 
own view for that of the national court. 
104
 See Elspeth Reid, “Rebalancing Privacy and Freedom of Expression” (2012) 16 Edin L Rev 253. 
105
 R (on the application of Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26; [2004] 2 AC 323 at [20], stating the 
so-called “mirror principle”.  
106
 See R (on the application of Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38; [2015] AC 657 at [70], per 
Lord Neuberger. This question is further discussed in R (Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] UKSC 
63; [2014] AC 271, notably by Lord Mance (at [25]–[27]) and Lord Sumption (at [121]). 
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(and balance reached) by the Strasbourg court?
107
 Lord Sumption, speaking extra-judicially, 
questioned the extent to which matters of legitimate national debate are now being resolved 
by an external court:108 
 
This perfectly straightforward provision [Article 8] was originally devised as a protection 
against the surveillance state by totalitarian governments. But in the hands of the Strasbourg 
court it has been extended to cover the legal status of illegitimate children, immigration and 
deportation, extradition, aspects of criminal sentencing, abortion, homosexuality, assisted 
suicide, child abduction, the law of landlord and tenant, and a great deal else besides. None of 
these extensions are warranted by the express language of the Convention, nor in most cases 
are they necessary implications ... The effect of this kind of judicial lawmaking is in 
constitutional terms rather remarkable. It is to take many contentious issues which would 
previously have been regarded as questions for political debate, administrative discretion or 
social convention and transform them into questions of law to be resolved by an international 
judicial tribunal. 
 
26 While not all judges are as critical as Lord Sumption,
109
 there is clearly concern that 
the formulation of legal policy is being determined in Strasbourg, not in England and Wales. 
This debate has received particular attention in the light of the political furore created by the 
prisoners’ rights debate, that is, whether the UK would be bound to follow the view of the 
Strasbourg court that prisoners should be given the right to vote.
110
 Indeed, the policy of the 
Conservative Party (having won the UK general election in May 2015) is to repeal the 1998 
Act and replace the ECHR with a British Bill of Rights.
111
 
 
27 Political jostling aside, these constitutional debates do have relevance to the 
application of substantive law. In developing a cause of action whose content reflects ECHR 
rights, the courts must consider to what extent privacy protection in England and Wales 
should be consistent with the interpretation of Art 8 by the Strasbourg court. As Phillipson 
has noted, this question arose immediately as commentators sought to ascertain how to 
reconcile the protection granted in Campbell to a celebrity photographed in the street with the 
more generous treatment of Princess Caroline of Monaco in Von Hannover.
112
 It was the 
influence of Von Hannover arguably which led to the more privacy-friendly treatment of 
                                                          
107
 See, for example, Jane Wright, “Interpreting Section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998: Towards an 
Indigenous Jurisprudence of Human Rights” [2009] PL 595; Brenda Hale, “Argentoratum locutum: Is 
Strasbourg or the Supreme Court Supreme?” (2012) 12 HRLR 65; and Roger Masterman, “Section 2(1) of the 
Human Rights Act 1998: Binding Domestic Courts to Strasbourg?” [2004] PL 725. 
108
 Lord Sumption, “The Limits of Law” 27th Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture, Kuala Lumpur (20 November 2013) 
at pp 7–8. Note also the concerns expressed in Lord Hoffmann, “The Universality of Human Rights” (2009) 
125 LQR 416. 
109
 Contrast, for example, the speech of Lady Hale, “What’s the Point of Human Rights?” The Warwick Law 
Lecture (28 November 2013). 
110
 See Hirst v UK (74025/01) (2006) 42 EHRR 41, discussed in Tom Lewis, “‘Difficult and Slippery Terrain’: 
Hansard, Human Rights and Hirst v UK” [2006] PL 209. Former UK Justice Secretary, Chris Grayling, has 
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Guardian (20 November 2013). 
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 United Kingdom, Conservative Party, Protecting Human Rights in the UK: The Conservatives’ Proposals for 
Changing Britain’s Human Rights Laws (October 2014). 
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 Gavin Phillipson, “The ‘Right’ to Privacy in England and Strasbourg Compared” in New Dimensions in 
Privacy Law: International and Comparative Perspectives (Andrew T Kenyon & Megan Richardson eds) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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photographs taken in a public place in the J K Rowling case.
113
 More recently, the Strasbourg 
court has sought to expand the content of privacy rights. In its 2013 decision in Söderman v 
Sweden
114
 (“Söderman”), the court expressly recognised that there were positive obligations 
on Member States to protect citizens from unwanted photography and video surveillance. On 
this basis, the courts should ensure that they protect against intrusion into the intimate aspects 
of one’s private life, even where physical violence, abuse or contact are not involved. In the 
earlier case of Reklos,
115
 the court also found a violation of Art 8 when photographs of a 
newly born baby had been taken without the parents’ consent and where the hospital had 
refused to return the negatives. 
 
28 What is noticeable about Söderman and Reklos is that liability goes beyond the 
dissemination of private information and extends to intrusion into the private lives of the 
applicants, albeit in both cases to obtain information. This seems closer to the situation in C v 
Holland rather than Campbell. As Moreham has recognised, such decisions raise real 
difficulties for the English courts. ECHR jurisprudence adopts a wide interpretation of Art 8 
which goes beyond protection of private information to include freedom from interference 
with one’s physical and psychological integrity and with the right to develop one’s own 
personality and identity and live one’s life in the manner of one’s choosing.116 In the light of 
such cases, should the English courts then extend the tort of misuse of private information to 
include behaviour such as unjustified surveillance or recordings even where the information 
has not been published?
117
 
 
29 At present, English law has not gone this far, although there have been hints that such 
an extension might be possible if “misuse” of private information is interpreted broadly to 
include not only publicising such information but also its mere acquisition without the 
victim’s consent.118 Even if this step were taken, however, a tort of misuse of private 
information could only extend to situations where information was accessed and could not 
therefore amount to a full “intrusion upon seclusion” tort. Bennett has concluded that:119 
 
... there is no indication, at the present time, that English courts are inclined to develop 
tortious protection for pure intrusions into the private sphere that do not involve publishing or 
acquiring private information without authorisation. Moreover, it remains unclear whether an 
unsuccessful attempt to acquire private information would also be actionable ... Clearly these 
points require more academic and judicial work before they can be satisfactorily answered. 
[emphasis in original] 
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 Murray v Express Newspapers plc [2008] EWCA Civ 446.  
114
 (5786/08) (2014) 58 EHRR 36 (stepfather videoing his 14-year-old stepdaughter when naked in the bathroom 
without her knowledge or consent). 
115
 Comment: Kirsty Hughes, “Photographs in Public Places and Privacy” (2009) 1 JML 159. 
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 Nicole Moreham, “The Right to Respect for Private Life in the European Convention on Human Rights: A 
Re-examination” [2008] EHRLR 44. 
117
 Nicole Moreham, “Beyond Information: Physical Privacy in English Law” (2014) 73 Camb LJ 350 at 357. 
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 Commentators, for example, Moreham, have seized on comments in Tchenguiz v Imerman [2010] EWCA 
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36 EIPR 298 at 303. 
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30 Bennett identifies the problems caused by the lack of clarity as to the exact nature of 
the relationship between the English and Strasbourg court. Put simply, should Söderman or 
Reklos be regarded as guidance which the English courts should follow or are they merely 
statements of the court’s approach towards particular factual situations arising in the context 
of Swedish and Greek law and therefore not necessarily directly transposable to other 
countries where the circumstances differ? The key problem here is that the courts are dealing 
with a new cause of action which requires them to reconcile two sources of case law which 
are not necessarily consistent: domestic and European. The tensions this causes practically 
and politically have been outlined above,
120
 but, importantly, have yet to be resolved. Given 
the multi-faceted character of this action and uncertainty as to its content and application, the 
next section will examine whether it is indeed possible to integrate this action into the 
existing tort law framework. 
 
B. Integrating the “tort” of misuse of private information into the common law of 
torts. 
31 The above analysis has noted the influence of European human rights in the 
development of what is now commonly referred to as the tort of misuse of private 
information.
121
 The action, nevertheless, by virtue of its incremental development, has been 
built upon the foundations of breach of confidence which is an equitable action based on 
good faith. The origins of the action are not irrelevant. The legacy of breach of confidence is 
a focus on informational privacy and an apparent willingness to use the equitable remedy of 
account of profits as an alternative to damages when appropriate.
122
 To complicate matters, in 
many leading cases, such as McKennitt,
123
 the claimants are able to raise both breach of 
confidence and misuse of private information claims. In McKennitt, for example, the 
complaint related to the disclosure by a close friend of personal confidences in a memoir. 
Such misconduct would, in fact, satisfy both the old action and the new and the courts do not 
always draw a clear analytical distinction between the two actions. The vestiges of the 
traditional breach of confidence action together with the influence of Arts 8 and 10 of the 
ECHR, therefore, render this a cause of action very different from that normally found in the 
domestic law of torts. 
 
32 The move towards formal recognition of misuse of private information as a tort has 
led a number of scholars to contemplate how such a tort would fit within the existing tort law 
framework. Roderick Bagshaw has argued that, in reality, the post-Campbell privacy tort is at 
odds with the design of English tort law.
124
 If, he argues, one of the aims of tort law is to 
regulate behaviour, how is this to be achieved by a cause of action which simply balances 
competing rights and where it may be difficult for an ordinary individual to determine the 
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precise balance between freedom of expression and the right to privacy?
125
 Donal Nolan 
further argues that the introduction of human rights principles into private law threatens to 
undermine the structural underpinnings of the law of tort.
126
 Such a view has received some 
support in recent case law. In Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police,
127
 for 
example, the majority of the Supreme Court found that:
128
  
Convention claims [have] different objectives from civil actions … Whereas civil actions are 
designed essentially to compensate claimants for losses, Convention claims are intended to 
uphold minimum human rights standards and to vindicate those rights. 
Jenny Steele comments that the current approach, which favours “shoehorning” claims into 
an existing cause of action, is far more appealing to common lawyers who prefer not to deal 
with broad general principles, in particular those deriving from that most diverse and elusive 
of ECHR rights: Art 8.
129
 Such views are important. They indicate that even if the English 
courts do expressly acknowledge the action of misuse of private information as a tort, this 
will not resolve the current conceptual confusion as to the interests this tort will seek to 
protect, its content or future direction.   
 
33 Formal classification, therefore, as a tort will not take us much further if the courts do 
not address the “exceptional” nature of this cause of action which introduces new forms of 
reasoning into the law, based on Strasbourg’s broad conception of the content of Art 8 of the 
ECHR. As the Court of Appeal recognised in Vidal-Hall v Google Inc, integrating misuse of 
private information into the law of tort will also require a number of practical questions to be 
resolved.
130
 Should, for example, the new tort be confined to protecting against misuse of 
private information, or should it extend to claimants such as the Wainwrights subjected to an 
invasive strip search?
131
 Would a broader tort be difficult to define with any degree of 
certainty and open the floodgates to claims to the ultimate detriment of freedom of 
expression? Further questions arise as to the remedies which should be available to claimants. 
Would classification as a tort signify that courts are no longer able to grant equitable 
remedies such as account of profits which are not usually awarded in tort?
132
 What of 
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authority indicating that exemplary damages should not be granted as they are not permitted 
under ECHR case law?
133
 There are no signs at present of the courts resolving these points. 
 
34 This leaves English law with a dilemma. The current legal position is uncertain; a 
position exacerbated by the fact that more than 15 years after the implementation of the 1998 
Act fundamental questions such as the indirect horizontal effect of the 1998 Act remain 
unresolved.
134
 Intervention is, therefore, needed. The current law rests in a no man’s land in 
which neither the courts nor the legislator
135
 are prepared to take decisive action to ensure the 
coherent development of the law. Previous experience has shown that the courts are prepared 
to develop the law incrementally, but are unwilling to engage in more detailed examination of 
the conceptual basis for a privacy law or matters of “high principle”. It also indicates that the 
legislator is not prepared to accept sole responsibility for developing a tort of privacy. It is 
submitted, therefore, that intervention realistically must come from a third party and here 
assistance may be found in another common law jurisdiction: Australia. The Australian 
courts have also struggled to determine whether they should recognise a tort protecting 
privacy rights. In the leading 2001 case of ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd,
136
 the High 
Court of Australia did not rule out the possibility of a common law tort of privacy, but left the 
question open.
137
 In June 2014, the Australian Law Reform Commission (“ALRC”), at the 
request of the Attorney General of Australia, published a report, Serious Invasions of Privacy 
in the Digital Era
138
 (“the ALRC report”), which outlined how a statutory cause of action for 
serious invasions of privacy could be designed.
139
 The ALRC recommended the introduction 
of an action which protected against invasions of privacy which were committed intentionally 
or recklessly by either intrusion upon seclusion or by misuse of private information. The 
opportunity was taken to set out the essential features of the tort including its conditions for 
liability, defences, limitation periods and other procedural matters. By describing the action 
as a tort, the ALRC hoped that this would encourage the courts to draw on established 
principles of tort law, providing a measure of certainty, consistency and coherence to the 
law.
140
 
 
35 While these recommendations have yet to be followed, the ALRC report illustrates 
the assistance which may be provided by a report by a law reform commission, notably in 
seeking to resolve legal uncertainty where the courts have struggled to provide the guidance 
which litigants need. The ALRC set out a framework for a new statutory tort, delineating its 
                                                          
133
 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 at [196]. 
134
 See Gavin Phillipson, “Clarity Postponed: Horizontal Effect after Campbell” in Judicial Reasoning under the 
UK Human Rights Act (Helen Fenwick, Gavin Phillipson & Roger Masterman eds) (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
135
 Consider, for example, the failure of the legislator to follow the recommendations of the Calcutt Review of 
Press Self-Regulation, which had recommended that the government should give further consideration to the 
introduction of a new tort of infringement of privacy: United Kingdom, Department of National Heritage, 
Review of Press Self-Regulation (Sir David Calcutt QC) (Cmnd 2135, 1993) at para 17. 
136
 [2001] HCA 63; (2001) 208 CLR 199. 
137
 See Robert Dean, “A Right to Privacy?” (2004) 78 ALJ 114 and Greg Taylor & David Wright, “Privacy, 
Injunctions and Possums: An Analysis of the High Court’s Decision” (2002) 26 MULR 707. 
138
 Australian Law Reform Commission, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era: Final Report 
(Report 123, 2014). 
139
 For comment, see Thomas D C Bennett, “Privacy, Free Speech and Ruthlessness: The Australian Law 
Reform Commission’s Report, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era” (2014) 6 JML 193. 
140
 Australian Law Reform Commission, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era: Final Report 
(Report 123, 2014) Executive Summary at para 1.9. 
19 
 
content and form. Likewise, consideration of the nature of the tort of misuse of private 
information by the Law Commission of England and Wales could play a vital role in placing 
the current law on a more conceptually coherent basis. In particular, it is suggested that the 
Law Commission should consider the following: 
 
(a) What areas of privacy should be protected? Should the tort extend to intrusion 
upon seclusion? 
(b) What degree of fault is required? Will negligence suffice or is intentional 
misconduct/recklessness needed? 
(c) What remedies should be available and, in particular, should aggravated and 
exemplary damages be awarded? An opportunity arises to include a remedy for 
account of profits, not usually granted in tort, which would provide a valuable 
addition to the court’s armoury of remedies. 
(d) Should the limitation period be reduced to one year? Rather than simply 
adopting the tort provisions of the English Limitation Act 1980,
141
 there is a clear 
argument that the hurt caused by invasion of privacy bears a closer analogy to the tort 
of defamation or breaches of the 1998 Act for which the limitation period is one 
year.
142
 Equally, provision may be made that the action should not survive the death 
of the claimant if this is deemed desirable. 
(e) Should the action exist for both natural persons and, more questionably, legal 
persons? 
(f) What defences should exist in addition to the balancing of freedom of 
expression and privacy in the two-stage test? The ALRC report, for example, provides 
for defences of consent, necessity and, more contentiously, an exemption for children 
and young persons. A debate on defences would be a desirable step forward. 
 
Further clarification could also be provided in relation to the application of the two-stage test, 
and, assuming that the 1998 Act survives beyond the May 2015 general election, the extent to 
which reference to the ECtHR is necessary in developing English law.   
 
36 While some of the reforms, for example, the matters dealt with at (d), would require 
statutory intervention, the real benefit of a Law Commission report in this area of law would 
be to provide an analytical framework for the coherent development of the law, which could 
be adopted by either the courts or the legislator. A future Supreme Court would therefore be 
in a position to introduce the kind of detailed tests seen in Hosking, C v Holland and Tsige. 
Equally, the foundations would exist for legislative intervention should this become a 
realistic option. In terms of common law evolution, rebooting the common law by means of 
intervention by a law reform commission is far from unknown, as seen in areas such as 
occupiers’ liability and contributory negligence.143 Given the real difficulties experienced by 
the courts in applying this new cause of action and integrating any tort of misuse of private 
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information into the ordinary law of torts, it is submitted that relying on the courts to continue 
to develop incrementally this area of law is unlikely to provide the certainty and structure 
expected in the common law legal tradition. Intervention is needed. The referral of this matter 
to the Law Commission of England and Wales is a necessary first step towards resolving the 
substantive and constitutional issues identified in this article. 
 
IV CONCLUSION 
 
37 In examining the development of privacy torts in England and Wales, New Zealand 
and Canada, this article has identified the extent to which the current state of the law is 
influenced by the courts’ interpretation of the existing constitutional framework (both 
international and national). Protecting interests as ill-defined as privacy in a context in which 
they are granted constitutional protection may be seen to raise particular challenges for the 
traditional incremental approach to tort law development. While the discourse in England and 
Wales has been dominated by the ECHR, that of New Zealand and Ontario has reflected the 
influence of US law and, in particular, the fourfold division of privacy into torts in the US 
Restatement. It is perhaps significant in the latter jurisdictions that the Bill of Rights Act and 
Canadian Charter expressly provide for protection of free speech, but that more general 
privacy protection has had to be inferred, tipping the balance more generally in favour of 
freedom of expression. On this basis, the natural comparator for these jurisdictions would 
seem to be the US. The differences between the constitutional framework of these 
jurisdictions and England and Wales are too great to provide assistance in the development of 
any English human rights tort. 
 
38 The English action for misuse of private information is, in reality, a distinct form of 
liability, which may be characterised as a hybrid of European human rights law and the 
common law. The English courts do seem to be attempting to superimpose some level of 
certainty by means of the two-stage test and a growing body of case law which gives 
guidance. Equally, in common with other jurisdictions, they have sought to confine liability 
to particular aspects of privacy (here the right to be protected against unwarranted publication 
of private information), rejecting a general privacy tort. However, there is an added level of 
tension arising from the need to integrate a European human rights action into the common 
law of torts. This has led to a lack of conceptual coherence. Simply changing the name of the 
action from “new breach of confidence” to the “tort of misuse of private information” is 
unlikely to give greater clarity overnight. This is an area of law in which the English courts 
are struggling to reconcile European human rights with common law forms of reasoning and 
practice. What is needed is consideration of how this cause of action should be integrated into 
domestic law and practical guidance about how this action is framed, both substantively and 
procedurally. 
 
39 The time has come to recognise that there is a need to stabilise the centre of gravity of 
the tort of misuse of private information. A Law Commission report would provide a 
valuable first step, but this will need to be followed by judicial or legislative intervention if 
the current situation is to improve. Failing this, it is likely that the courts will continue to take 
small incremental steps to develop the tort, but that progress will be slow and at the expense 
of conceptual clarity. Evolution in tort law can be unpredictable and create uncertainty, but it 
is argued here that it is the role of the law to provide victims injured by unwarranted 
intrusions into their personal life with a clear basis on which to seek a remedy for the wrong 
committed against them. 
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